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Itin Size of Cyclical Fluctuations in Inventory Investment
iShare of Inventory Investment in Movements of Gross
o es- National Product
busi- The timing of inventory investment indicates the direction in
ycks which it acts on business activity at different stages in the cyde.
t be- The importance of the role of inventory investment depends upon
fac- the size of its fluctuations. Some summary indication was given in
deci- Chapter I Ofl the basis of average experience in the interwar period
pro- (Table i). This preliminary discussion ended with the following
out- paragraph:
IflS. "These estimates are, of course, crude, but they are sufficiently ac-
rS to curate to establish several important propositions.One is that, on the
ating average, a very considerable portionof the cyclical change in total
With output has taken the form of an alteration in thevolume of goods
added to stocks. A second is that, during ordinary businesscycles,
fluctuations in the rate of inventory investment as a whole havebeen
ns of
larger, in terms of the value of goods involved, thanthose in con-
struction or in the flow of durable goods to eitherproducers or con-
sumers. And a third proposition isthat inventory investment, in terms
of the violence of fluctuation, is the most volatileof the main corn-
ponents of output."
Table 84 subjects these conclusions to moredetailed examnina-
tion to see whether the observations based on averages areequally
valid for individual cycles and are notpeculiar to only one or two.
If they are generally valid, fluctuationsin inventory investment
will obviously have a very great effect onthe movements of gross
national product. For each expansion ofgeneral business Table
84 shows the difference between grossnational product in the year
of depression with which the expansion startsand that in the year
.TABLE 84
Gross National Product and Its MainComponents
Changes during 5 Business Cycles,1919.s 938
At. AN.
VALUE,
$ RIWON,CHANGE, $ RILLION, CHANGE Al % 1929 I92PRICES CHANCE INtap piiCEsLip.(Muir.Cycle Lap.Conir.C7 (1) (s)() (.$) (s) (6)('
FIRST CYCLE:1919.50.,, a Gross national product 66.6 ,.-p.65.0 IOO.O 100.0100.0 * Flowofgood,toco,uumers *.t ao i.60.4 142.9--44.4 a Durablcs 4.7--0.!-o. o.8-7.! E5.o,5.,, b Nondurable, 28.0 o.i 1.1-5.0 7. 58.$40.0 c Services '9.4 2.0 0.3 1.7 142.9-8. ,i.o Capital formation '4.5-o.6 5.1 4.5 42.9141,7 a Construction 5.2-1.10.9 -LI-83.7 -*5.0-4to I) Public 1.4-1.1 o.- 1.6-78.6 -,.g .-eo a) Business 2.2 0.5-0. 0.4 11.4 a.8 8.o ) Residential *6 0.4 0.5 0.9-18.6 -13.g -18.o b Prod. durableequlp. 4.9--o.a 1.7i.6 7. 47.1 a.o c Net change us claims against
foreign countries 1.55-0.7-0.1-o.6-5o.oe.8 -ts,o d Net change in inventorie,
(lnventoInvestment)
a) Total 2.79 1.4-4.2 5.6 100.0ii6. 111.0 a) Total. cxci. farmers a. o.6-2.8 5.4 4'.9 .8 68.o 3) Mfr. inventorje, 1.09 04-i.6 2.0 *8.6
SECOND CYCLE:1911.13.54 * Grosanationalproduct 73.3 14.6 a. 100.0100.0200.0 * Wl0wofgoodaw00nsumfl B.i 4.1 4.0 t7 50.3 a Durable, .7 2.6 0.3 2.3 17.8so.o,.5 b Nondurable, 52.2 5.7 1.0 1.7 253 66.7 20.6 c Services ".5 1.9 2.8-0.9 13.0186.7-6 5 Capital Ionnatio,, 13.9 6.4-2.79.1 45.8 - .80.0 6 a Construction 7.6t5 1.0 1.5 17.1 66.7 11.3 I)Public ..6-o.0 0.5 -0.4-0.7 20.0 3.I a) Business 2.7 0.7 0.1 0.6 4.8 6.7 4.6 ) Residential 34 1.9 0.6 1 53.040.0 9.g b Prod. durablecqulp. 4.8 a.-o *6 '5.'-26.7 sg.8 c Net change in claims against
foreigucollntrie, 0.54-l.a0.4 -1.5-7.5 -ii. d Net change in invcntorie,
(inventory Investment)
a) Total o.88,. 6.5 19.2 -246.749.6 a) TotsI, cxci. farmers 1.17 1.5-2.9 .s s.8 -195.3 39.7 ) Mfr. inventories o.6g 5.4-a.6 .o 9.6 -i6.7529
THIRD CYCLE:1914-16-17 Gross national product 85.4 8., 1.07. ,00.o100.0100.0 * Fl0wofgoodjuscou 67.9 i. 2.3 48.8 170.031.9 a Durable, 8.o 5.7-0.4 2.1 20.7 -40.0 19.2 b Nondurable, 35.8 a.o i. 0.5 *4.4170.0 4.5 c SerVicEs 24.1 0. 01 - 5.j 411 .4 3 Capital formation 17.5 -0.75.0 52.4-70.0694 a Congructi 10.3 i.6 0.1 1.5 29.3 10.0to.8 Public 2.0 o. 0.5 0 3.730.0 0 Bu,ines 5.6 1.o 0.1 0.9 IL! 10.0 1*3 Residential 4-7 0.4-0.3 0.7 4.9 -o.o 9.7 b Prod. durableequjp. 6.s 1.1-0.4 1.5 23.4 -40.0 20.1 c Net change in claims against
foreign countrie, 0.3!-0.50.3 -0.8-6.a 30.0-11.1 d Net change In Inventorle,
(inventory lnvcstnient)
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,Groes national product










c Net change in claims against
foreign countries
d Net change in Inventories
(inventory inyestmcnt)
1)Total










79.0 58.7-5.2 s.8 100.0100.0
6.8 t7.8 0.717.1 6s.o -25.6
5.7 3.0-1.4 4.4 10.5 45.5
59.8 8.7 0.1 8.6 30.5-3.2
24.3 6,o 2.0 4.0 20.9 -64.5
9.5 11.0-3.914.9 38.8ss.8
4.5 5.3-0.5 5.5 4.5 6.
1.9-0.1 0.2 -0.5-0.5-6.5
1.1 0.4-0.4 o.8 1.4 12.9
14 0.9 0.2 0.7 3.1-6.
44 4.1-1.9 6.o 14.36i.
o.o8-0.1 1.2-1.3-0.1
0.18 5.8-5.9 8. 20.2
0.16 -24 7.8 i8.8
0.23 5.2-a.65.8 11.1
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s Gross national product 86.7 7.6-32.059.6 100.0100.0
S Flowofgoodstoconsumers 4.7-15.2'9.9 6i.8 47.5 50.3
a Durables 7.5 o.6-4.5 5.2 7.9 14.1 529
b Nondurable. 37.8 i.8_4.4 6.s *3.7..8 25.7
c Services 27.0 2.3-6.s 8.5 30.3 19.4 22.5
Capital formation ,.6 s.8-16.719.5 p6.8 51.1 49.5
* Construction 8.g-0.5-.8 -6.6i8i tg.4
1)Public s.6 0.1-o.s 0.3 ,. 0.6 o.8
) Busin 3.4 0.1-2.9 3.0 2.3 9.1 7.6
) Residential 2.9-oS-2.7 19-20.5 84 4.8
b Prod, durable equip. 5.7 i.-.o 6. 18.4i.6 i6.s
c Net change in claims against
foreign countries 0.47 0-0.4 0.4 0 1.2 2.0
d Net change in inventorics
(inventory investment)
s) Total -0.37so-.6 7.6 s6. 17.5 19.2
s) Tot3l. cxci. farmers -0.48 a.o-6.i8.i *6. 29.1 so..














AVERAGE OP PIVI CYCLEI
79.8 12.1-7.119.8 100.0100.0100.0
66.5 7.3-1.4 8.7 6o.i.6 45.1
6. s.6-1.4 2.9 12.9 29.1 15.1
6.a o., 3.1 ,6.9-1.4 16.5
14.0 2.5 0.2sb 20.7 2.9 15.7
13.5 4.8 5.810.6 39.5 80.4 54.8
7.1 0.7-o.8 1.5 6.1 11.0 8.o
2.0-0.! 0.!-0.4 1.5-5.0 2.1
2.5 0.5 0.6 2.1 4.1 8.8 5.9
.6 04-0.30.7 3.5 .7 9.8
5.1 1.7-i.9 .6 244 s6.o 28.7
0.50-0.5 0.3o.8 4.1-.6-e.g
& Gross national product









b Prod, durable equip.
c Net change in claims against
foreign countries
d Net change in inventories
(inventory investment)
1) Total 0.56 2.8-34 6. as.3 41.5 51.4
a) Total, cad. farmers 0.58 2.4-3.1 3.5 20.0 42.8.8.
5) Mfr. inventories o.36 2.4-s.8 5.? 12.7 14.9 *6.6
Sources and method of computation aredescribed in notes to Tableexcept fo the aver-
age cycle values shown in col. 1. Toavoid downward bias the averagevalue for carla cycle
si computed by weighting the years ofinitial and terminal trough one-hall.and the other
years wcluded in a cycle one.478 CHAPTER TWENTY.ONE
of prosperity with which the expansion ends. For each contraction
it shows the difference between gross national product in the year
of prosperity with which the contraction begins and that in the
year of depression with whichthe contraction ends. The total
change in gross national product during the expansion and con-
traction that make up a full cycle (measured from trough to
trough) is computed by adding the change in gross national prod-
uct during expansion to its change during contraction (signs dis-
regarded).' Table 84 shows also the same sort of calculation for
each of the principal components of total output. And each abso-
lute change in a component is expressed also as a percentage of
the change in total product during the same period. For easy
reference the averages of Table i are repeated.'
The preliminary conclusions of Chapter i arc well supported
by the data for individual cycles. No less than 17.5 percent of the
change in gross national product took the form of a change in in-
ventory investment in any single phase (expansion or contrac-
tion). For full cycles the minimum figure, which occurred in 1927-
32, was 19 percent. At the other extreme the change in inventory
investment in one contraction, i 923-24, was nearly two and one-
half times as big as the change in gross national product. Inven-
tory investment moved down during this business recession but
gross national product measured by annual data increased slightly.
The maximum figure for a full cycle, that of 1919-21, was 112
percent. Excluding investment by farmers, the figures are only
slightly smaller. Investment in manufacturing industries alone ac-
counted for a large share, ranging from 28 to too percent of the
change in all inventories and averaging almost exactly one-half.
Cycle by cycle fluctuations in the rate of inventory investment
as a whole have also involved larger changes in the value of goods
'Thc mild business contractions of 1923-24 and 1926-27 appear in the an
nual gross product estimates only as virtual cessations of growth, not as actual
declines. In these cases we subtracted the change during contraction from that
during expansion to get the change over the full cycle. In effect, we treated
the growth during contraction as a negative response to the business cycle.
2Similar Computations were presented in NRER Bulletin 7. The importance
of fluctuations in inventory investment in changes in gross national product
has been emphasized also by Alvin H. Hansen, Fiscal Policy and flusiws
Cycles, Ch. z; see below, Sec..produced than in producer durables, consumer durables, or total
construction. Indeed, the difference in total inventory investment
between prosperity and depression was usually about twice as large
as that in the first two categories, and more than twice aslarge as
that in the third. The change in manufacturers' inventory invest-
ment alone was usually about as large as that in the outputof
producer and consumer durables and larger than that in construc-
tion.
Volatility is a vexed question on two counts. It suggests some
measure of relative amplitude, that is, acomparison between the
absolute size of the swing in a series and its normal level. However,
some of the present series have negativevalues, notably the in-
ventory investment series themselves. In consequence,their aver-
age level for the entire periodapproaches zero and in some cycles
is negative.3 Percentage computations in such cases giveabsurd
results. True computations of volatility, in the sense statedabove,
are therefore impossible.But speaking loosely, there can be little
question that inventory investment is extremelyunstable. Imagine,
for example, that manufacturers' inventory investment were$2
billion higher each year and that total inventoryinvestment was
$billion higher, thus eliminating all negativevalues. The aver-
age level of total inventoryinvestment (either including or ex-
cluding farming) would still not exceed the averagelevel of the
output of consumer or producerdurables or of total construction.
And the average level of manufacturers'inventory investment
would be about half as high. The relativeamplitude of inventory
investment in toto or by manufacturersalone would still be larger
than the relative amplitudes of theseother volatile series.
This, however, raises a secondproblem. While inventory in-
vestment is, of course,measured net, the output of producer dur-
ables and of construction is measured gross,that is, before depre-
ciation is deducted. Since depreciationvaries little during business
cycles, the total cyclical swing ofthese activities would be little,
if at all, reduced on a net basis;but their average levels would be
markedly lower. Net output ofproducer durables is, of course, far
more volatile than grossoutput. But for the analysis ofbusiness
The same is true of 'net changes inclaims against foreign countries'.
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cycles the comparison betweennet additions toinVentories and
gross additions to other capital is the correctone. Decj)nstOpur-
chase or produce plant and durable equipmentover and above the
quantity required to replace plant andequipment retireddepend
upon the same set of considerations as influencepurcha.to off.
set retirements. Both dependupon estimates of theprofitability of the capital in the future,not simply on the Operationsof the
current period. And since replacements rarelyhave thesame tech..
nical capacity as the equipment retired,it is doubtful thata clear
line can be drawn betweenproduction or purchase forreplace-
ment and that for additions to durableequipment. Therecan be
little question, however, thatbusinessmen do distinguishbetween
purchase or production of goods forsale or consumptionin the
current period and that for additionto inventory, and base their
decisions about eachon different considerations. Subjectto what
has already been said aboutunplanned inventory investmentit is
this fact that makes it usefulto study inventory investmentin an-
alyzing business cycles.
These questions aside, thereare still qualifications to be borne
in mind when studying Table84. They do not, I think,affect the
major showing of the data, butthey are important. Annualesti-
mates typically understate the sizeof cyclical fluctuationsand do
so in different degree in differentcycles and in differentseries.4
Monthly data wouldundoubtedly change the size ofthe cyclical
swings in inventory investmentcompared with those in other ele..
ments of capital formation, but Iwould not expectmy general
observations about relativemagnitudes to be modified.
Another consideration isthat Table 84 shows thesize of cycli-
cal changes during fixedperiods, namely, those boundedby the
business cycle peaks andtrougin identified by theNational Bureau.
It does not show themagnitude of the cycles in individualseries.
In annual data this haslittle effectupon the cyclical amplitude of
the two inventory investmentseries or upon that ofthe output of
producer durables. It does,however, reduce significantlythe am-
While quarterly estimatesof gross national productare available (notably in Barger's Outlay andincome in the Unittd States,1921-1938) 1 do not regard quarterly estimates ofaggregate or manufacturen' inventoriesto be sufficiently reliable for thesepurposes.CYCLES N INVENTORY INVESTMENT 481
plitude of the fluctuations inconsumer durables and construction.
The reason is that the first three series respondedregularly, and a!-
most synchronously, to the ups and downs of business inthe inter-
war period.5 The last two, however, not only declined during the
business expansion of 1919-20 but skipped the mildcontraction of
1923-24; construction also skipped that of 1926-27. Nevertheless,
the relations previously discernedamong the cyclical magnitudes
of the series still hold good ifwe confine our observations to the
last cycle when all five series conformed closelyto the movements
of business at large. And the same is true ifwe extend our observa-
tions to 1926-38 when all except construction conformedclosely
to the calendar year reference dates.
We must repeat the cautionary note sounded above. The fig-
ures show how much of the change in total output between the
trough and peak of business took the form ofa change in the rate
of inventory investment. They do not tell how much of the change
in output was caused by a change in the rate of inventory invest-
merit, because the inventory investment figures include some un-
planned investment or disinvestment and hence either overstateor
understate the actual quantity of output thatcan be traced to
some businessman's desire to increase his stock. Such unplanned
changes in stock are, no doubt, less important in annual than in
monthly data, but they are always present in some degree.
Finally, although a large portion of the cyclical changes ingross
national product typically takes the form of a change in inventory
investment, the share of inventory investment has varieda great
deal from cycle to cycle. These variations are not entirely hap-
hazard. If we classify our data by the length of expansion and con-
traction, an inverse relation is apparent between the length of the
phase and the share of changes in inventory investment in changes
in gross national product (Table 85). Despite some variation, the
trend of the figures in each column is clearly downward the longer
the phase, and the inverse relation stands out still more boldly if
we average the figures for phases that lasted about a year, those
that lasted about 2 years, and those that lasted about 4 years.
5 Producer durables declined slightly from 1919to1920 when business was
rising.482 CHAPTER TWENTY..
Ti 85
Cyclical Changes in Inventory Investmentas Percentage of Change
in Gross National Product, by Length of Phase,'9'9-'938
LENGTH CHANCE ASOP CHANGE IN GNP
OF PHASE, Total, cxci.










AVERAGES FOR PHASES OF
STATED LEN0TR
.67& 1.00 g6 6o 56
1.50-2.25 47 36 20
3.75&4.17 19 19 9
* Derived from theNational Bureau monthly referencecycle chronology.
a Phases with negativefigures omitted.
2Factors Determining theRelative Size of Fluctuationsin
Inventory In vestment and inGross National Product
This Sectionattempts to identify the causes of thetwo chief char-
acteristics of the size of fluctuationsin inventory investment: the
relatively large fractionthey typically constituteof the cyclical
fluctuations in gross nationalproduct and the tendency of the
fraction to diminishthe longer the expansionor contraction. We
consider first an oversimplifiedand, in many ways, unrealisticsys-
tem, whose operationcan be expressed in easy formulas. Laterwe
allow for the main differencesbetween the imaginaryeconomy de-
scribed by our fonnulasand the more intricateeconomy of the real
world.
Our imaginaryeconomy has two features importantfor present
purposes. First, the inventory.outputratio remains constant. This
has its elements of reality,for most businessmentry to maintain an
approximately constant ratiofor most of their inventories, and
wide departures fromthe desired ratio willnot be tolerated indefi-
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which may persist for months. We shall haveto allow for them
later. The second feature concerns the pattern of cyclical fluctua-
tions. We assume that the absolute increase in outputper unit of
time is constant during expansion; that the absolute decline in
output is constant during contractions, and that thc rates of in-
crease and decline are equal. These assumptions taken together
imply that the increase in inventories per unit of time will be con-
stant and proportionate to the rate of increase in output.
We may now write the following equation for inventory invest-
ment in a peak year of business (ii):
i)Ii = Pir, where
P = the average value of gross national product during the
preceding cycle, measured from peak to peak
t = the inventory-gross national product ratio
rthe annual rate of increase in gross national product dur-
ing expansion
The decline in inventories during the preceding trough year of
business (12) would be:
Iz=Pt(r)
For the whole expansion the increase in output that takes the
form of an increase in inventory investment is the difference be-
tween the amount added to stock in the peak year and the amount
liquidated in the preceding trough year. Writing L1 for 1 - 12,
we have:
LI=PtrPt(r)=2Ptr
The total increase in output during expansion (0) may be
written:
A0=Pra,where
a = the length of expansion in years, and P and r are de-
fined as in (I).
Finally, the ratio of the change in inventory investment to the
II \.
total change in output is:
E I2 Pt r2 t
3OPra aCHAPTER TWETY..ONE
We may say, then, that the share of the changein inventoryin.
vestment in the total change in gross national productduringan
expansion depends directly upon the size oft, theinventoryutput
ratio, and that it varies inversely witha, the length of the phase.
Of course, exactly the same thing would betrue of contractio
Given the assumptions, the bases and implicationsof the formula
can be grasped intuitively by considering the followingfacts:
The proportion that a given annual increasein output be
to the accompanying increase in inventories dependsupon the in-
ventory-output ratio. If the ratio is i :, whenoutput incre
$ioo inventories will increase $25.
The change in inventory investmentbetween a troughand a
peak equals the difference in theamount of stocks accumulated in
the last year of expansion and theamount liquidated in the last
year of contraction. Hence the proportionate relationbetween a
given annual increase in output and thechange in inventory in-
vestment between a cyclical trough and peakmust be some multi-
ple of the inventory.-output ratio. Ifthe annual increase inoutput
and inventories in expansion equals thedecline in contraction, the
multiple is, of course,2.
The change in inventory investmentbetween a trough anda
peak is, however, not to becompared with a single year's increase
in output, but rather with thecumulative increase duringall the
years of an expansion. Given a constant absoluteannual increase
in output, the total change betweentrough and peak equals the
annual increase multiplied by thenumber of years the expansion
lasts. Hence the length of theexpansion in years is the denominator
of the fraction.
This summary formulationdraws attention to two important
and valid aspects ofa true explanation of the contribution of in-
ventory investment to general businessfluctuations. One is the
size of the inventory-salesratio in the United States.The tech-
nique and organization ofour economy are such that the inven-
tories carried to facilitateproduction and salesare large relative
to the output or sales ofa year. Excluding farm stocks, which
behave erratically andto which the theory doesnot apply, the ratio
during the interwar periodwas about .34. Thus a given increase in

























34 percent aslarge. And the change in inventory investment be-
tween the beginning and end of expansions or contractions should,
on our preliminary assumptions, be 68 percent of the change in
output during one-year phases and proportionately less during
longer phases. The second point is that business cycles in the
United States have typically been short. Four of the five contrac-
tions in the interwar period lasted 20 months or less, and four of
the five expansions lasted 27 months or less. The simple theory
outlined above suggests that the combination of a large inventory-
output ratio and short cycle phases will usually produce high ratios
of changes in inventory investment to changes in gross national
product, and this is what we find (Table 85).
We must now make a closer comparison between the theoretical
values that may be derived from our formula with the observed
shares of inventory investment. Since the argument on which the
formula is based clearly does not apply to farm stocks, the calcula-
tions are confined to total investment excluding fanning and to in-
vestment by manufacturers. As stated, the inventory-output ratio,
i, was about .34 during 1919.38; the correspondingratio for man-
ufacturers was about Theoretical values for the share of
changes in inventory investment were calculated from these ratios
and a and from the actual length of expansions and contractions as
crease shown in the National Bureau monthly chronology of business cy-
all the des (Table 86).
C1C5SC Despite the wide differences in individual phases betweenthe
als the actual and theoretical values of inventory investment thevalues
Ofl tend to be roughly similar, since averaging the figuresfor phases
ator of about the same length greatly reduces the differences.The larg-
est divergences are in the shortestphases, for which, as will be
seen, there is a good reason.Moreover, the extreme differences ap-
pear in the two phaseslasting 1.17 yearsthe mild contractions
of 1923-24 and 1926-27, when inventoryinvestment dropped
markedly but the annual estimates of grossnational product rose
slightly. This made the changes in inventoryinvestment very large
compared with the (inverse) change in grossnational product.
8 average value of nonfarm stocksin current prices was about $26 bil-
lion, that of manufacturers' stocks about$12billion. Gross national product
was about $76 billion on the average.These figures are based on Kuzneta'
estimates from which the inventory investmentfigures were derived.
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TABLE 86
Cyclical Changesin Iiivciitoiy Ilivestilielat:Theoretical and Actual
Shares in Changes in Gross National Product,1919.1938
CHANGE ASOF CHANGE IN ONP
* Phases with negative figures omitted.
The obsen'cd discrepancies are no less than might be expected
in view of the unreal elements in the theoryon which the formula
is based. The essential requirement of the theory is that inventory
investment in the last time-unit of an expansionor contraction
in this case the last yearbe proportionateto the average absolute
increase in output per time unit during the phase. This inturn
would occur if (a) the absolute rate of change inoutput were con-
stant during a phase, (b) the rate of growth in output during
(say) expansion were equal to the rate of decline duringthe pre-
ceding contraction, and (c) the inventory-output ratio remained
constant so that changes in inventory were always proportionate to
changes in output.
None of these requirements is wholly satisfiedby the output and
inventory cycles we observe. Therate of change in output is not
constant over an entire phase. As we haveseen, it usually increases
to a maximum, often early in a phase, then tendsto grow or decline
at a lower rate. Irregular movementsare common, and especially
in expansions output often tendsto spurt toward the end of the












.67 91 43 43 29
i.00 68 77 8
1.17 58 193 27 107
1.17 58 130 27 8o
1.50 45 26 2! 20
1.67 4! 44
1.67 41 i6 19
2.25 30 22 14 7
3.75 i8 19 9 7








PHASES OF STATED LENGTH1
6o 32
36 18 20
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end of the phase just equal the average rate during the phase. On
the other hand, the irregularities characterizing therate of change
in output make it unlikely that the differences between theaverage
and end of phase movements will be systematic.
Next, the rate of change in output duringa given phase will
rarely equal that during the preceding phase. While there isno
evidence that expansions and contractions usually have different
paces, the rate of change does vary from one phase of the business
cycle to the next. Therefore, even if we couldassume that the in-
ventory-output ratio is always constant, the change in inventory
investment per annum would seldom be exactly proportionate dur-
ing any given phase to twice the rate of change in output per an-
num.
Finally, the inventory-output ratio is not constant because
changes in inventory are not proportionate to changes in output
during the same period. During the first 6-12 months of expansion
of output, stocks continue the decline begun during the preceding
contraction, although at a slower pace. Thereafter they grow, first
slowly, then more rapidly, attaining a maximum at or near the
peak of the business cycle. During contractions of output, similarly,
stocks usually continue to grow, though at a slower pace, during
most of the first year; thereafter they decline at an increasing pace,
being most rapidly liquidated near the trough in business.
In these circumstances, it is easy to see why there are so many
large discrepancies in individual cycles between the actual change
in inventory investment relative to the change in gross national
product and the relation indicated by the formula. But why does
the formula yield results that are satisfactory in a general way?
Why do the average shares for inventory investment approach the
theoretical shares, attaining large values in short phases and vary-
ing inversely to the length of the phase? An answer can be formu-
lated in general terms.
The relation between output and most categories of inventories
is such that one cannot long increase or decline substantially faster
than the other. If they did, stocks would become either intolerably
large or inconveniently small compared with output, and business-
men would take corrective measures. For the function of most
classes of stocks is precisely to facilitate output or sales. This is ob-A
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vious for the bulk of stocks held byretailers andwholesalers Mo manufacturcis' stocks are inone of four classes: goodsinproce materials or finished goods in transit,reserves held agaitdeJa in delivery, or finished goods orderedand awaiting delivery.For all these purposes, the amount ofstocks required iscontrolled by the rate of output or sales. The inventory-outputratio mayvary, but it cannot increaseor decline indefinitely without settingoff a cot. rectjve reaction.
As far as can now b' judgedfrom our studies ofmanufactu'
stocks, when the rate of change inoutput leaps upwardat the be- ginning of expansion-_ordownward at the beginningof contrac.
tionbusinessmen are unable, and,with respect tosome classes of stocks, unwillingto effectuate a simultaneousand cotnpar1,le
movement of inventories. Not until the betterpart of a year has
passed arc the inertial forcesderived from thepreceding phaseso far overcome that stocksbegin to move in thesame direction as out-
put. As the first year ofa phase proceeds, more andmore busin
men accept the fact that the cycle hasdefinitely turned, andmore are able to free themselves fromold commjtmeziAt the same time, a growingdisproportion betweenoutput and stocksem-
phasizes the necessity forenergetic measures to bringthe latter into line.
In the first year ofa phase, then, the net changein inventories will be smalleitherthe precedingmovement will continue ata slower paceor a small movement in theopposidirection will start. The difference betweenthe change inoutput and in inv:i.
tories is large in thisstage. Not until thesecond year of a phase
does accumulationor liquidation of stocks pickup speed. From that time forth,inventories may changemore slowly or faster than
output,7 but theirpace, though it may lag,cannot continue to
differ widely from thatof output withoutproducing an intolerable
departure of inventory..outputratios from the levelsbusinessmen
consider efficient. Therate of change inoutput in the later stages of a phase may,and in most individualinstances will, differ from the average rate duringthe phase, butthere is no general rule
The indicationsare that the movenlent ofinventories Continues, on the whole, somewhatmore slowly than that ofoutput since inventory-output ratios vary inverselyto output untilnear the end of phases.CYCLES IN INVENTORY INVESTMENT 489
about the difference between them. The average rate will some-
1mcs be hghcr, sometimes lower. We may, therefore, conclude
that the rates of change in stocks in the latter part of a phase will,
on the average, be similar to the average rate of change in output
during a phase. In the same way, if there is no large systematic
difference between the pace of expansions and of contractions, the
difference between inventory investment at the end of any given
phase and at the end of the preceding phase will, on the average,
be about twice the size of either.
This argument applies to phases long enough for inventories to
overcome their initial lag behind output, that is, phases of two
years or morethe usual duration. But what about shorter phases?
Does our argument imply that the change in inventory investment
is unlikely to absorb a large part of the change in national product?
On the contrary, it suggests merely that inventory investment or
disinvestment in the given phase is unlikely to be large. The change
from the rate of investment at the end of the preceding phase may
well be large, as it was in each of the four short contractions of the
interwar period. Three followed expansions of two years or longer,
which ended with high rates of inventory accumulation. The
fourth, 1920-21, followed the great speculative accumulation of
1919-20. Therefore, while liquidation was large in only one of
these short contractions, the reduction in the rate of accumulation
from that ruling at the end of the preceding expansion accounted
for large reductions in output and income. In general, it would
take a short contraction following a short expansion to create a
presumption that a cyclical change in inventory investment would
not be large relative to a change in gross national product.
The large share of the cyclical changes in gross national product
that typically takes the form of a change in inventory investment is
founded on a particular combination of time factors: the length of
the usual cycle phase and the lag of changes in inventories behind
those in output. Given the lag, changes in inventories would be a
less aggravating agent in business cycles were it not that cyclical
phases exceed a year. For in a phase that lasted only a year,the
rate of change in stocks at the end of thephase would probably be
small. It might even operate in a counter-cyclical direction as often
as not. And given theduration of phases, the course and charac-490 CHAPTJR TWENTYNE
tcristics of the cycle would be different didinventoryinVesment not lag behind the rate of change in output. Forif Outputand
stocks moved together, the swings ofoutput would bestrongly re-
inforced early in each phase by parallelmovements in inventory
investment. And inventory investment inturn would tendto fall
off later in the phaseas the rate of change in output oftendoes in
expansion and usually does in contraction.It would notsweep up
smoothly until the end, ornear the end, of expansion anddown
until near the end of contraction.
This formulation, however, is inan important sense unreal. The
combination of phase length and inventorylag is not fortuitous.As
we have seen, in contractions the rate of declinein output hasusu-
ally reached a maximum well beforethe end of the phase,oftener
than not in the first half. Thereafterit slackened. Ifwe now sup-
pose that inventory investment and therate of change in output
move synchronously, the rapid decline inoutput in the first half
of contraction would beaggravated by an equally rapiddecline in
stocks. When the rate of declinein output falls, however,inventory
liquidation also would decline.This would constitutea powerful
force for revival. Theseconsiderations suggest, therefore,that if
inventories changed synchronouslyand proportionately withsales,
business cycles would be shorterand more violent than theyare.
The lag of inventoryinvestment tempers the effectof the early de-
cline in sales on output. Butwhen the rate of decline(or growth)
of sales begins to fall off,more rapid inventory liquidationoperates
to extend, rather than to haltand reverse, the swing of business.
And similar considerationsapply to expansions. Thelag of inven-
tory investment thus helpsto account for a notable featureof ex-
pansions and contractions:business usually continuesto move in
the same direction formany months after itspace has begun to
slacken. By the same token,it helps account for thefact that cyc-
lical phases usually lasttwo years and often longer duringwhich in-
ventor)' investment (orliquidation), despite its tendencyto lag,
reaches high levels. On theother hand, since phasesrarely exceed
three years, their lengthdoes not usuallyact as a drag, bringing the
share of inventoryinvestment in changes ingross national product
to a low level.
There are indeedgood reasons for believingthat the relationS
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between the lcngth of cxpansions or contractions and the sharc of
inventory investment in changes in gross national product must be
inverse. For, as we have seen, if changes in output per unit of time
are constant during a phase and changes in inventory are propor-
tionate, an inverse relation is inevitable. This would not be true if
we assumed that the rate of change in output increased sufficiently
rapidly during a phase. But the assumption would be unrealistic
(Ch. i6).
Must the relation be inverse if we make the realistic assumption
that inventory movements lag behind those in output at the trough
(peak) of business and increase (decline) steadily until the peak
(trough)? It must, provided certain restrictions on the variation
of inventory-output ratios are accepted. Consider an hypothetical
expansion from a trough in an imaginary Year 0.
The special assumptions of Case i are:
Inventory investment in the trough year equals 40 percentof
the annual change in output assumed. This isreasonable in the last
year of a phase in view ofthe over-all inventory-output ratio in
this country.
The annual increases in output are constant.The trend of
the figures in line 6 would be still morestrongly downward if we
assumed that output increased at adeclining rate. It would not
necessarily be downward if the rate ofgrowth in output increased
rapidly enough. But, as stated, to assumeincreasing rates of growth
throughout a phase is unrealistic.
Inventories do not show any net changeduring the first year
S
YEAR
0 I 2 3 4
iGross national product 100 110 120 130 140
2Change in GNP between
YearO&givenyear 10 20 30 40
Inventories (end of year) 40 4043.246.830.4
4Inventory investment 4.0 0+3.2±3.6+3.8
5Change in inventory in-
vestment between Year
0 & given year .+4.0+7.2+7.6+7.8
6Ratio: line 5line 2 . .40 .36 .25.195
7Inventory- outputratio:
line 3line1 .40 .36 .36.6 .36t
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of expansion.This correspondsapproximately withthe factsand reflects the long lag ofstocks behindoutput. d)The inventory-outputratio falls in thefirstyear, reflecting the lag of stocksbehind output,then remainsconstant. Thetrend in line 6 wouldbe still more stronglydownward ifwe assumed,in accordance with theevidence (Ch. 6),that the
inventory..output ratio continuesto decline at leastslowly untilnear the peak ofbusi- ness. But the ratio ofthe change ininventory investmentto that in gross national productneed not declineas the expansionlengthens if theinventory-output ratio isallowed to increase.
Case 2 illustratesa situation in whichthe share ofinventory investment in thecyclical rise ofgross national productremains constant. But theimplicationsare such as to makethis situation unlikely in the realworld. Theinventory-outputratio rises 28per- cent from the firstyear of expansionto the fourth, therate of rise accelerating eachyear. This,moreover, is the ratioof aggregate stocks toaggregate output. Sincemany categories ofstocks lag be- hind output bymore than ayear or vary inversely,inventory- output ratios forother categoriesmust rise evenmore swiftly. A tendency forinventories toincrease so muchmore rapidly than sales would probablybe checkedby a reductionin inventoryaccu- mulation. A stableratio of changein inventoryinvestment to that in gross nationalproduct could beconsistent witha stable inven- tory-output ratio onlyif outputincreased atan ever fasterpace. And the accelerationin output growthwould needto be still more rapid if theinventory-output ratiowere to decline duringexpan- sions and riseduring contractions,as it appears tohave done. In
Case 2
YEAR
0 5 2 3 4 iGross nationalproduct ioo i 10 120 130 140 2Change in GNPbetween j Year 0 & givenyear .. 10 20 30 40 Inventories (end ofyear) 40 40 44 6 4 Inventoryinvestment 4 0+4 + 8+12 Change ininventory in-
vestment betweenYear 0 & givenyear .. +4 4-8+ 12+i6 6Ratio: line± line2 . .40 .40 .40 .40 7Inventory- outputratio: )ine-- line t .40 .36 .37 .40 .46
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the light of experience, however, continued acceleration in output
growth or decline is an inadmissible assumption.
The tendency for the share of change in gross national product
that takes the form of a change in inventory investment to be
smaller the longer the phase rests, it appears, on two circum-
stances: (a) the tendency for the inventory-output ratio to vary
inversely to output; (b) the fact that the rate of change in output
does not continue to accelerate during expansions and contrac-
tions. The inverse movement of the inventory-outputratio may be
traced to the conglomeration of factors that together control the
volume of stocksthe desire of businessmen to keep stocksof most
kinds in line with output or saks; the obstacles to promptadjust-
ment of stocks to changes in sales,especially the time required for
purchasing, production, and transportation, and thedifficulties of
forecasting; finally, the fact that some kinds of stocks areused as
buffers to cyclical changes in demand. Thecyclical pattern of
changes in output, however, raises problemsfar beyond the scope
of this book. For present purposes, we must acceptit as a fact, es-
tablished empirically and to be explained only by a more compre-
hensive investigation of business cycles.
Short Cycles, Minor Cycles, and InventoryCycles
The analysis in preceding sections showsthat changes in inventory
investment are significant in shortexpansions and contractions.
But the longer the phase, thesmaller the contribution of inventory
investment to the further advance ordecline of business. Con-
versely, the longer the phase, the moreit must depend upon con-
sinners' expenditures or businessinvestment in plant and durable
equipment for its motive force.In this significant but limited
sense, it seemsappropriate to think of short cycles asinventory
cycles while longer movements areidentified with other categories
of demand. Short expansions orcontractions would be far milder
than those we haveexperienced were it not for theaction of in-
ventory investment.Longer phases, say of 3 yearS or more,could
not have occurredwithout the increasing interventionof changes
in consumer or businessexpenditure that are independentof inven-
tory movements.For after that intervalfurther change in inven-
tory investment, ifthere is any, is likely to be quitesmall.CHAPTER
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While this aspectof the role of inventoriesin fluctuationsof dif. ferent lengthshould be recognized,it leavesopen anothervital question: why dosome movements end afteri 2 or imonth while others last.j. oryears? Theoutcome may turnon the entire assemblage of forcescontrolling expenditureson producerdurable and consumergoods. Thesemay at times make fora strongsus- tained increase indemand whileat other timestheir strengthis quickly exhaustedand a declineensues. If this is thecase, there is nothing to addto what was said inthe precedingparagraph. Several writers,however, havedevelopeda more systematic conception of therelation betweenshort and longcycles in busi. ness. Professor Hansen,for example,following thelead of Pro. fessor Schumpeter,distinguisheso year "long waves",8 year "major" cycles,and3 or 4 year "minor" cycles.9The longaes and major cycleshe attributesto innovations, thatis, to investment in constructionwork and durableequipment associatedwith the business exploitationof significantdevelopments intechnology, business organization,the geographyof markets,and the like. The minor cycles hebelievesarc caused "notinfrequently" byfluctua- tions in inventoryinvestment.
The generalthesis that businesscycles may bearranged in sets of 2 or3 that together constitutea cycle of a higherorderminor cycles, in Hansen's














CYCLES IN INVENTORY iNVESTMENT 495
cycle: "Unlike investment in plantand equipment. . . inventory
investment does not progressivelysustain the recovery during an
entire major upswing. On the contrary,the upswing is checked,
at intervals of three tofour years, by disinvestment in inventories,
or a declinein the rate of accumulation. It is this ebband flow of
inventories which apparently dominatesthe minor cycle." In the
terminology of preceding sections,Hansen finds that the portion
of the change in grossnational product taking the form of a change
in inventory investment wasmuch smaller in the major upswing
validity of this observation may be seenin Table 87 which ana-
lyzes the major cycle 1921-32 inthe same form as the business
cycles identified by theNational Burcau are analyzed inTable 84.
The share of inventory investment wasdrastically lower in the long
1921-29 than in theminor fluctuations within thatperiod.10 The
The difference is especiallymarked in comparisons betweenthe
cycle 1921-32 than in the fiveshorter cycles of the interwarperiod.
long expansiOn 1921-29and the short expansions. Theshare of
inventory investment inthe expansion of grossnational product
between 1921 and 1929 wasonly 7.3 percent; excludingfarmers,
the short expanSion 1921-23,when inventories were lessimportant
it was 5.8 percent; formanufacturers alone it was 3.3percent. In
than in any other shortexpansion of the period, thecomparable
figures were 19.2, 15.8,and 9.6 percent. The differencebetween
the share of inventoryinvestment in the longexpansion 192 1-29
and its average share in thefive shorter expansions wasstill more
marked. A similarly drasticshift appears in the relativesize of in-
ventory investmentand other elements ofprivate investment. In
the shorter expansionsthe portion of the changein total output
that took the formof a change in the rateof accumulation of stocks
was regularlylarger than that whichtook the form of an increase
in the output ofproducer durables, consumerdurables, or con-
struction. The shareof inventory investmentby manufacturers
alone sometimesexceeded that of the variouselements of durable
goods output orconstruction and it wasalways larger than half
the share of eachof the other categories.In the 1921-29 expansiOn,
however, total inventoryinvestment increasedless than any of
I
'°To the writer'sknowledge, the first investigatorto make this observation
was Simon Kuznetl(NBERBulletin 74).496 CHAPTER
TABLE 8
Gross National Product and Its MainComponents
Changes during the Major Fluctuation,
'92129..32
As'. AN.
$ ItjIONCIMNGE, $ I1tUO, IAJI*1 % 1919 1929 P11W
Dl cap sPicesEap.Contr.Cycle Lapc (') (x) 1')(i) (5)(6) ( I Gross national product 82.7 31.9-52.06..g 100.0
a Flow of gooth to rOnsUnlen67.7 22.6- 5.!37.8 68.747. a Durable, 7.0 4.8 4. 9.3 14.6 14.1 b Nondurable, .8 10.2-4.414.6 31.0'3.8ei. c Service, 24.7 7.7-6.ti.g 53.4 1954 Capital formation 15.1 ao.i--16.726.3 32.5 a Construction 8.g 4.7-.8,o. '45 8.m, i) Public ,.i 0.9-o., 17 0.6 5) Business 3.3 2.0-2.9 4.g 6.ig., 7.6 ) Residential z.8-a.745 5.3 8464 b Prod, durable equip. .6 .g-.o 8. ".9i.6 c Net changes in claims sgainst
foreign countnc, 0.44 O.5....7 '.5-0.8 d Net changes in In'ientorjes
(inventory investment)
i) Total o.o a_-5.68.0 7.3 I7. a) Total.exi. fsrmers 0.37 1.9-6.i8.0 5.5 £9.1II )Mfr. invntorjes o.6 1.1-1.4 3.5 7.5
these other categories ofcapital formation, and thegain in invest-
ment by manufacturers alonewas less than half the increase inany of them.
The long contraction7929-32 was marked by a similar shiftin
the proportion of thetotal change in outputaccounted for by in-
ventory investment. The share oftotal inventory investmentin the
decline of outputwas only 17.5 percent while theaverage for the 5
contractions was47.percent; the share of total investmentex-
cluding that by farmerswas 19.1 percent and the five-cycleaver-
age, 42.8 percent; for manufacturingalone, the comparable figures
were 7.5 and 24.9 percent. Theshare of all threewas much smaller
than ui any of the shortercontractions.
Hansen offers the followingexplanation of the role of inventory
investment in minor cycles(p. 17):
"When anupsurge in real investmentoccurs, it is not unusual for
the spurt in inventoryaccumulation to run ahead of thenormal re-
quirements indicated by therising trend. When thisis the case, sooner or later a temporary saturationin inventors' accumulationdevelops, leading to an inventoryrecession. Not infrequentlythe minor setbacks
experienced in the majorupswings may be characterizedas inventory
recessions. But sometimesother situationsmay initiate or aggravateF.
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these minor recessions. Thus, for example, in the beginning of the
major upswing it may be that large investment in improved machin-
ery occurs and that after a time a temporary saturation is reachedin
this type of investment leading to a recession. The general buoyancy
of the upswing, however, soon starts the economy upward again with
a further burst of real investment after the temporarysetback thus sus-
tained. Sometimes special situations are partly responsible for minor
recessions, such as critical international developments, labor disturb-
ances, or even special factors having to do with major industries,such
as the Ford shutdown in1927.Regularly, however, inventory move-
ments play an important role."
The prominence of inventory investment as an aggravating
agent in short cycles, asserted in Hansen's last sentence, maybe
considered as established (see Sec. 2 above). The issue, however,
is precisely whether the shorter declines of business areinitiated
by the appearance of saturation in the demand foradditional in-
ventories or by a failure of demand for other kinds of goods.Un-
fortunately, with the evidence now available this issue cannotbe
brought to a decisive test.
Hansen's statements"it is not unusual for the spurt ininven-
tory accumulation to run ahead ofthe normal requirements indi-
cated by the rising trend" and "When this isthe case, sooner or
later a temporary saturation in inventoryaccumulation develops,
leading to an inventory recession"lcave openthe question of the
forces that cause inventory investment atfirst to rise too rapidly,
then to fall off. The cause suggested by theanalysis in preceding
chapters of this study is that output atfirst rises rapidly but later
more slowly and thatinventory investment follows the patternof
the rate of change in output. Sooner orlater inventory investment
would diminish. However, investment inmajor categories of stocks
raw materials hdd bymanufacturers and stocks of wholesalers
and retailerstends to lag behindthe rate of change in output.
There is also some evidence thattoward the end of expansions, in-
vestment in finished goodsheld by manufacturers tends to rise.
It may be questioned, therefore,whether the downturn in inven-
tory investment thatthe retarded growth in outputwould eventu-
ally bring about actually occursbefore the demand for producer
durables and other categoriesof commodities begins to fall. Were498
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adequate monthly data available, thisissue could besettled but,
as pointed out above, in their absence the factsremain in doubt
(Ch. i).
Mere retardation in the growth ofoutput is not the soleagency
able to cause a decline in inventoryinvestment that mayprecipitate
a business recession. Lloyd Metzler has describedanother proc
the outlines of which are plausible (cf.Ch. i). He callsattention to the fact that when business revives,manufacturers and dealers
have difficulty in effectingan appropriate increase in theirstocks.
Indeed, the first effect ofan increase in business is tocause stocks
to fall temporarily, leading toa sharp drop in inventory.output
and inventory-sales ratios. In subsequentperiods businessmenat-
tempt not merely to increase inventoriesin proportion to incre
in output and sales but alsoto accumulate enough goodsin addi-
tion to restore inventory-outputratios to desired levels. Theproc
of bringing inventoriesonce more into line with the level ofoutput
and sales takes some time, butwhen it has beenaccomplished, an
important source of demand foradditional goods disappearsand
inventory investment tendsto fall.
Forces of this type undoubtedlyinfluence the behavior ofsonic
leading categories of stocks.But whether, in the face ofthe otta-
des to the prompt adjustment of stocksto sales and output, they
operate sufficiently rapidly is againnot clear. Indexes of inventory-
sales and inventory-outputratios for all manufacturerssuggest that
there is no pronounced rise beforethe peak in business. If thiswere
true for all important inventorycategories it would count heavily
against Metzler's thesis. Butwhether or not it is true will beknown
only when long series ofinventory dataare available for the com-
ponents of manufacturers' stocksand of stocks held by other indus-
trial divisious.
A decline in inventoryinvestment may be precipitated by still
other causes. Pricespeculation may occur from timeto time lead-
ing to periods of rapidaccumulation followed by attempted liqui-
dation when priceexpectations change. Widespread alternations
in the degree ofoptimism with respectto the demand for goods
may have the same results. Butagain there is no evidence that these
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Finally, there is no presumption in favor of the idea that the
role of inventory investment is the same in every short cycle. It
may, as Hansen suggests, act as the precipitating agent of some re-
cessions and merely as an aggravating agent in others. The out-
come may turn on how soon after the onset of business revival the
rate of growth of output begins to decline and on the degree of
retardation. If the rate of growth starts to fall relatively early, in-
ventory investment is more likely to reach a peak earlier than other
types of expenditure. And if retardation is very marked, the
concomitant decline in inventory investment is more likely to be
sufficient to precipitate a business recession despite the continued
rise in other categories of output. If the retardation occurs rela-
tively late and is relatively mild, the recession in business may be
set off by a failure in other types of demand. That the preciseorder
of events does not repeat itself from cycle to cycle is, of course,
highly plausible. But future studies must still try to determine the
relative frequency with which inventory investment initiates the
upturns and downturns of business.
This is an important problem in the mechanism of business cy-
cles quite apart from the Schumpeter-Hansen multi-cycletheory
which has given it prominence. If it proves impossible toidentify
an 8 or io year cycle inexpenditures for construction and equip-
ment, we shall still want to know how oftenand under what cir-
cumstances upturns and downturns arcprecipitated by inventory
investment. If the existence of a major cycle canbe established,
the multi-cycle theory will stand whether or notinventory invest-
ment turns out to be a regularprecipitant of the minor fluctuations
it envisages. It would be extremely interestingif one could resolve
these questions now, but they must awaitadditional work and
better evidence.